NOTES
CORPORATIONS: NEW YORK LIMITS POWER OF
DIRECTORS TO BLOCK CORPORATE ACTION BY
ABSTENTION FROM BOARD MEETINGS
MiNoRlTy directors sometimes abstain from board meetings in

order to prevent a quorum from being formed and thus, in effect,
prevent the board from taking any action. Heretofore no doubt has
been expressed either by the courts or the commentators as to the
propriety of such conduct.'
The use of this tactic, however, is limited by the recent New York
case of Gearing v. Kelly.2 There a director, to prevent a quorum
from being formed,3 refused to attend a meeting called to fill a
vacancy on the four-man board. The two remaining directors
ITomlinson v. Loew's, Inc., 86 Del. Ch. 516, 134 A.2d 518, aff'd Per curiam, 37 Del.
Ch. 8, 135 A.2d 186 (1957); Campbell v. Loew's, Inc., 26 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d 852
(1957). See also Zachary v. Milin, 294 Mich. 622, 293 N.W. 770 (1940), and Trendley
v. Illinois Traction Co., 241 Mo. 73, 145 S.W. 1 (1912), holding that a director cannot be
trapped into attending a board meeting. The policy behind the inability to trap a
director and the absence of a duty to attend appear quite similar. Basic to each is the
understanding that "there is no legal process by which a director of a private business
corporation can be forced to attend a meeting." Id. at 94, 145 S.W. at 6.
A majority stockholder generally has the same fiduciary duty as does a director,
Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919), and courts generally allow such a
stockholder to abstain from a stockholder's meeting. In the Matter of Pioneer Drilling
Co., 36 Del. Ch. 386, 180 A.2d 559 (1957). Contra, Hill v. Town, 172 Mich. 508,
138 N.V. 334 (1912); cf. In re P. F. Keogh, Inc., 192 App. Div. 624, 188 N.Y. Supp.
408 (1920).

2 11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (5-to-2 per curiam decision),
affirraing 15 App. Div. 2d 219, 222 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1962), reversing 29 Misc. 2d 674,
215 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. 1961). The corporation, Radium Chemical Company, Inc.,
was formed by Messrs. Kelly and Gearing, each owning one-half of the stock. These
two and an employee constituted the board of directors. In 1952, at Mr. Gearing's
death, Mrs. Meacham, petitioner, replaced her father on the board. In 1955, with
Mrs. Meacham's approval, the board was enlarged and Mr. Kelly's son was added.
This case concerns the resignation of the employee as director and the attempt to
have her replaced by the son-in-law of. the elder Kelly, thus making three of the
four directors members of the Kelly family.
3In absence of a controlling statute, charter provision, or by-law, the stockholders
present at a duly called meeting, though a minority, constitute a quorum, BALrXNnTNE,
CoROroxTzo4s §45 (rev. ed. 1946); SPEL AN, CoPORATZ DimaroRS 86 (1931), but a
quorum does not. exist at a board meeting unless a majority of the directors are present.
Calumet Paper Co. v. Haskell Show-Printing Co., 144 Mo. 331, 45 S.W. 1115 (1898);
Morrill v. Little Falls Mfg. Co., 53 Minn. 371, 55 N.W. 547 (1893), affd after retrial,
60 Minn. 405, 62 NAV. 548 (1895); Annot., 21 L.R.A. 174 (1893). The distinction is

Vol. 1963: 154]

CORPORATIONS

attended, "elected" a friendly fourth director, and thereby secured
complete control of the corporation. Although section 25 of the
New York Business Corporation Law allows the court either to
4
confirm an election or to order a new one "as justice may require,"
the minority director here sought to vacate the election. The trial
court set aside the election because of the absence of a quorum.
The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the director was
estopped to contest the validity of the election since she had intentionally abstained from the meeting.r Agreeing with this reasoning, the Court of Appeals held that the director could not complainl
of an irregularity which she had caused" and therefore justice did
between a body of an indefinite number, i.e., stockholders, and a body of a definite
number, i.e., boards of directors or trustees. Ibid.
However, once a quorum is present, the subsequent withdrawal of persons otherwise sufficient to prevent a quorum from being formed does not affect valid actions
taken at the meeting after their departure, Hexter v. Columbia Baking Co., 16 Del.
Ch. 263, 145 AtI. 115 (1929); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sheip v. Vandegrift, 232 Pa. 53,
81 At. 153; Annot., 36 L.R.A. (N.S.) 45 (1911), unless there is a controlling statute,
charter provision, or by-law specifically requiring a majority vote for the specific action,
Bridgers v. Staton, 150 N.C. 216, 63 S.E. 892 (1909); In re Argus Printing Co., 1 N.I).

434, 48 N.W. 347 (1891).
6N.Y. GEm. CoRP. LAw §25. This statute vests in the court only the power to
confirm an election or order a new one. In re Election of Directors of Radiant
Knitting Mills, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 915, 194 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1959). However, it
has been held that there is an implied power to vacate an election without ordering
a new one, when the latter would be futile. Application of Katz, 2 Misc. 2d 325,
But see In re
143 N.Y.S.2d 282, aft'd, 1 App. Div. 2d 657, 147 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1955).
William Faehndrich, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 468, 472 n.3, 141 N.E.2d 597, 599 n.3, 161
N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 n. 3 (1957).
The counterpart of §25 in the new New York Business Corporation Law, §619,
removes this limitation by providing that the courts may "confirm the election, order
a new election, or take such other action as justice may require." (Emphasis added.)
N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAws § 619 (effective Sept. 1, 1963).

1The Appellate Division, 15 App. Div. 2d 219, 222 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1962), alternatively
held that a quorum was present by interpreting the by-laws to require, for a quorum,
only a majority of the remaining directors and not a majority of the entire four-man
board. The trial court, 29 Misc. 2d 674, 215 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. 1961), held to the
contrary. The general rule is that, absent a contrary provision in the statutes,
charter, or by-laws, the quorum is based on the entire board and is unaffected by
vacancies. See Cirrincione v. Polizzi, 14 App. Div. 2d 281, 220 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1961);
BALTENmNE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 45. The new New York Business Corporation Law
is to that effect. N.Y. Bus. Cop. LAw §§ 702 (a), 707 (effective Sept. 1, 1963).
The new New York statute providing that vacancies may be filled by a majority of
the remaining directors, though less than a quorum exists, may eliminate the problem
presented in the principal case. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 705 (a) (effective Sept. 1,
1963). But compare Tomlinson v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 1, with In re Chelsea
Exch. Corp., 18 Del. Ch. 287, 159 Atl. 432 (1932). The Model Act, twenty states,
Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia have similar provisions. MoaDL Bus.
Cope. Acr ANN. § 36, 2.02 (3) (b) (1960).
$The court also denied relief to a complaining stockholder, the director's mother,
because she had encouraged and colluded with the director. If it is conceded that
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hot require a new election.7 The court thus implied that there is.4
duty to attend board meetings but failed to discuss this duty. The
court also did not address. itself to the significance of the. director's
ihotive for abstention although it may be inferred from the opinion,
when taken -in conjunction with the allegations of the respective
parties, that motive was of dispositive importance.8
In prior decisions allowing a director's abstention from board
meetings, the motives of. the director have not been controlling.,
In the leading cases on this'point, Tomlinson v. Loew's, Inc.1o and
Campbell. v. Loew's, Inc.,n two factions, neither constituting a
quorum of the board of directors, were fighting for control of a large
the director should not be allowed to complain, the court's action in denying relief
to the stockholder is supported by sufficient authority. Cf. Brusha v. Board of Educ4,
41 Okla. 595, 139 Pac. 298 (1913). But see McFadd6n v. Allen-Nelson Mill Co., 150
'Wash. 249, 272 Pac. 714 (1928).
TWhere a quorum is not present an election is illegal. 2 FLETcHMR, CYCLOPEDIA 'or
PRIVAXE CORAIwavONS § 428 (rev. vol. 1954). It has been held that "as justice may
require" is considered only if the election was legal and the complainant can show
that a new election would correct an inequitable result; but that where an election is
shown to be illegal "there is no election and justice requires no further showlng:"
In re Green Bus Lines, Inc., 166 Misc. 800, 804, 2 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (1937). Cf. In 7.a
Lake Placid Co., 274 App.'Div. 205, 81 N.Y.S.2d 36, motion for leave to appeal denied,
298 N.Y. 932, 82 N.E.2d 44 (1948) (quorum not present, court invalidated election
without a showing that justice so required).
8The respondents alleged that the director was attempting to frustrate respondents'
management of the corporation until her inexperienced husband was elected to fill the
vacancy on the board and was given a salary equal to that received by the younger
Kelly, president of the corporation. Brief for Respondents, pp. 2.6. Gearing v. Kelly,
11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962). By characterizing the director's conduct as an "intentional and deliberate" attempt "to paralize the board,"
the court appears to have been persuaded by respondents' allegations. 11 N.Y.2d at 203,
182 N.E.2d at 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 898. This finding seems untenable in view of the
fact that the director had agreed to attend any board meeting which had a stipulated
agenda precluding a filling of the vacancy. 11 N.Y.2d at 205, 182 N.E.2d at 392, 227
N.Y.S.2d at 899 (dissenting opinion).
In Britain the corporate practice'is to have a low quorum, but a closed agenda
at stockholder meetings. Gower, Some Contrasts Between British and American
CorporationLaw, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1369, 1391 (1956).
• However, in the Campbell case, the court indicated that the motive for abstention
,
may be a factor to consider by saying,
.While a concerted plan to abstain from attending directors' meetings may be.,
improper under some circumstances, I cannot find that the fact that the so-called v:
Vogel directors did not attend directors' meetings called to take action which
would give an opposing faction an absolute majority of the board-solely
because of director resignatibns-is' such a breach of their fiduciary duty that
they should.b judicially compelled to attend board meetings.
Campbell v..Loew's, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 563, 587, 134 A.2d 852, 866 (1957). But cf.
Stone v. Auslander, 28 Misc. 2d 384, 212 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
. '1
10 36 Del. Ch. 516, 134 A.2d 518, aff'd per curiam, 37 Del. Ch. 8, 135 A.2d 186
(1957):
" 36 Del. Ch. 563, 134 A.2d'852 (1957).
I
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public issue corporation.. The. majority faction -met, elected. direclors to fill certain vacancies and sought to ,have the .Delawre
Chancery Court declare, the election valid, despite their- non-compliance .with the quorum .requirement. In deixying the majority's
petition Chancellor Seitz held-that no sanction could be based upon
the opposing faction's refusal to attend a director's -meeting, notwithsta.nding their clear.intent to.prevent the board from takinr any
action.
In comparing Gearing xith.the Loew's cases, two .things must
be considered. . First, unlike the Loew's cases, Gearing v. Kelly
involved a close corporation.12 Second, high quorum requireme!nts,
which are designed for close cgrporations, cannot be successfully
utilized unless directors are .allowed to -refrain from atteiiding a
particular board meeting. Raviing'said this, and noting that Loew's
allowed a director of a public issue corporation to feely abitain
from a board meeting, it would appear logical for the court t5 have
followed the'same rule in Giaringv. Kelly.
. In considering the greater need for high quorum requirements
and. other protective devices in the close corporation. its cnaracteristics should be carefully distinguished from those of the public issu!
"corporation. Persons entering into these "chartered partnerships"'8
do so primarily to obtain limited liability and the tax advantages
incidental to the corporate form, while operating the business as if
it were a partnership..' In these "incorporated partnerships,"' 4 a perr
son not having a large bloc of distinterested stockholders to whom
he can appeal must have means -by which he can prevent his relega
tion to an ineffective minority position. Investment in a close corporation usually represents a greater portion of a person's wealth than,
does investment in any one public'issue corporation'. The possi1 One of the reasons that legslatures have not enacted statutes specially adapted
to the dose corporation has been the- difficulty in defining that entity. Ditty, The
Close Corporation and the New North Cafolina Business Corporation Act, 34 N.C.L.
Rav. 432 (1956): For s~me suggested definitions see Winer, Proposing a New
York 'Close Corporation Law,' 28 CORNELL L.Q. -313, 314 (1943); Israels, The Close
Corporationand the Law,-33 CORNELL L.Q. 488 (1948). The North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, without trying to define a close corporation, is designed to accommodate this corporate form and did so by limiting its application in "certain instances
-b a coiporaion;'thd stock of which is not generally traded. slC. GEN. STAT. § 55-73 (b)
_(1960). For a discussion of this definitional difficulty, see 1 O'NEAL, CLoSE CoiwoRAroNs
§.021 (1998).'
: Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 447i 98 N.E. 855, 856 (1912).
It Cuppy v. Ward,. 187 Ap; Dir. 625;' 639, 1-76 N.Y. Supp. 233, 243 (dissenting
opinion), aff'd per curiam, 227 N.Y. 603, 125' N:E. 915 (1919). ". " -
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and thedifficulty- of disposing of these hold-

ings necessitate" the availability of protection. Persons in a close
corporation frequently .want to. control expenses, limit the nature
of the business, regulate the distribution of profits,1 6 or determine
the admission of other persons to the firm. 7 Based solely on these
policy considerations, it would appear that protective devices1 8 serve
a more useful purpose in the close than in the public issue corpora.
tion.
The courts should not impede the desire to obtain beneficial
features of both corporate and partnership structures when neither
the stockholders, the creditors, nor the public are damaged thereby.' 0
Statutes have been passed which obviously understand and foster
these ambivalent desires.20 Since the legislatures are willing to
countenance these objectives, it is difficult to understand why the
New York court failed to show the same degree of empathy.
Admittedly, the use of protective devices increases the possibility
25See generally O'NE.AL AND DERwlN, EXPULSION OR OPPRSSION OF BUSINESS ASSocIATES (1961).
26 In
a close corporation, profits are generally distributed through salaries and therefore persons actively engaged in the -business desire to insure the receipt of a good
salary. If, however, an investor in the corporation is not working in the business,
he will want to make sure that substantial dividends are paid so that he will receive
a satisfactory return on his investment.
T
7Retrictions on stock transfers so that the corporation gets a first-option can
successfully control admissibility of other persons, O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of
Stock in Closely Held Corporations:Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REV. 773
(1952), while pre-emptive rights will perpetuate a stockholder's original degree of
control. For a discussion of the development of pre-emption, see Drinker, The Pre.
.mptive Right of Shareholders to Subscribe to New Shares, 43 HARV. L. REv. 586

<1930).
isTypical protective devices are: (1) high vote and high quorum requirements, (2)
,voting and non-voting shares, (3) class voting for directors, (4) stockholder agreements,
<5) voting trusts, and (6)irrevocable proxies. 1 O'NEA,, CLosE CORPORATIoNS
§ 4.05 (1958). For a full discussion of high vote and high quorum requirements, see
Id. ch. 4.
20 For the opinion of an enlightened court see Kauffman v. Meyberg, 59 Cal. App. 2d
730, 739, 140 P.2d 210, 215 (1943), where the court said: "[Tjo permit the technical
rules as commonly applied to corporations to be applied in the case of a close family
corporation of two shareholders of equal ownership, would serve to defeat such
equality of ownership, impede justice and perpetuate fraud." For a discussion of
desirable statutes, see Winer, supra note 12. For an analysis of the North Carolina
Business Corporation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§55-1 to 55-175 (1960), which, without
express designation, was enacted to accommodate the close corporation, see Latty,
su4ra note 12.
-oSee, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. AaT ANN. § 87 (1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.37

(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1961); PA. STAT.

ANN.

tit. 15, § 2852-402(5) (1958).

See generally

Cary, How Illinois CorporationsMay Enjoy PartnershipAdvantages: Planningfor the
Closely Held Firm, 48 Nw. U.L. Rav. 427 (1953).
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of corporate paralysis.or the extortion of selfish concessions. 21 These
factors, however, should be the concern not of the courts, but of the
corporate participants. They realized these limitations, but deemed
it best to protect their interests by resorting to protective devices.
It must be remembered that in a close corporation persons generally expect to be able to protect their interests in just such a
fashion. If a court is preoccupied with the fear of corporate paralysis,
as apparently was the situation in the instant case, its decision will
be disproportionately influenced by a result the shareholders were
willing to risk, but will ignore an objective-protection-which the
shareholders were more desirous of securing.
The attitude of the court in tampering with an accepted corporate practice is reminiscent of the attitude evinced in Benintendi v.
Kenton Hotel,22 an earlier New York case, where high quorum and
high vote requirements embodied in the by-laws of a close corporation were declared invalid as inconsistent with corporation
law and public policy. Though such provisions are still invalid
if placed in the by-laws,23 the legislature, by enacting statutes which
allow such provisions to be put in the charter,24 has exhibited a
realization of the necessity of treating close corporations as "chartered partnerships," and has thus fostered veto provisions as a means
2 Protective devices also have certain limitations whether used in the close or the
public issue corporation. They do not allow a minority stockholder to take affirmative action in the development of corporate policy and they hinder flexibility in
adapting to changing circumstances. O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto
Corporate Decisions: Use of Special Charter and By-Law Provisions, 18 LAw &
CONTErM. PROB. 451, 471-72 (1953).
2 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E2d 829 (1945). See also Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31
S.E.2d 893 (1944) (invalidated charter provision requiring unanimous approval for
board action).
2sThus, in effect, Benintendi, as strictly interpreted, is still followed. Compare
In re William Faehndrich, Inc. 2 N.Y.2d 468, 141 N.E.2d 597, 161 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957)
(invalidated two-thirds quorum requirement in by-laws) with In re Election of Directors
of Radiant Knitting Mills, Inc., 20 Misc. 2d 915, 194 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (upheld charter provision requiring unanimous vote of board).
21 N.Y. STocx CoRp. LAW § 9. See 62 HARV. L. REV. 526 (1949) for a discussion of
§ 9, the legislative response to Benintendi, which recognized the close corporation as
akin to both the partnership and the public issue corporation, but significantly
different from each. The new New York Business Corporation Law, as did § 9 supra,
authorizes the charter to require that quorum and vote requirements for directors'
action, N.Y. Bus. CoaR. LA W §§ 709 (a) (1) -(2) (effective Sept. 1,1963), and for stockholders' action, Id. §§ 616 (a) (1)- (2), be greater than a simple majority.
However, the Law Revision Commission's Reports suggested that § 9,. and presumably the new statutes, changed the result, but not the reasoning, of Benintendi.
BAKER & CARY, CAsES ON CORPORAoIoNs 294 (3d ed. 1958).
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:of f ithering-the wishes -and protecting'.the interests of invest6rs
in close corporations.
However, ther.emay be. some question as to the wisdom of a high
.quorum requirement as a means bf protecting minority stockholdpr
interests. -Such a protective device diseourages attendan ce of a dissi.dent.minority and thereby militates against the discussion of differences and the possibility of arriv.ing at a compromise. Moreover, it
_prevents consideration not only of the controverted subject matter
but also of other matters which normally would come before the
.meeting. Though high quorum and high vote requirements provide
more'flexible protection, when used together, they nevertheless cannot be utilized simultaneously. If a person goes to a meeting relyiig
on the high vote requirement as a protective device, then the high
quorui requirement is of no benefit; and if he abstains "from'the
meeting because of the latter, then h6 cannot take adVantag6 of the
former. 5
.t In upholding the contested election, the New York court failed
to discuss a director's duty of attendance, upon vhich the holding
seems premised, and-to support its holding either by precedent or
reasoned discussion. However Gearingv. K61y,' vhile casting doubt
on the availability of abstention to defeat a quorum, nevertheless
may provoke beneficial inquiry into the desirability of high quorum
requirements as an effectiv6.safgilird of.mi iority.-stockholder and
director interests.
2'See 1 O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRPomAxiONs

§ 4.22 (1958).

